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University of Chicago

ABSTRACT

This article presents an empirical study of statutory interpretation. Respondents were asked to read
statutes and answer questions about how they should be applied to simple cases. The results suggest,
ﬁrst, that it is difﬁcult to separate judgments about the linguistic meaning of a statute from policy
preferences about it. Different ways of framing the interpretive question have consequences, however;
asking how an ordinary reader would interpret a text helps produce answers that are distinct from a
respondent’s own preferences about it. The article considers why this might be so and discusses
implications for the interpretation of statutes by courts.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Most studies of statutory interpretation concern themselves with how statutes should
be read. Many fewer ask how statutes are read in fact, and the few studies of this second
question have been based on what judges say about what theories of interpretation lead
them to read statutes as they do. The project of this article is to reexamine the reading
of statutes from the ground up by asking what cognitive challenges and hazards are
associated with it. Our goal is not to explain what judges do, though the results found
here might have some provocative implications on that score. Our goal is to better understand the baseline position from which a reader—any reader—comes to the task of
interpreting a law; it is to know what baggage a human who reads a statute starts out

We thank Jack Beermann, Frank Easterbrook, Einer Elhauge, William Eskridge, David Klein, Gary
Lawson, Richard Posner, Stephen Williams, and three anonymous reviewers, as well as workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Boston University, and the University of California, Irvine, for
helpful comments. We thank Adam Badawi, Anthony Casey, Mary Anne Franks, Adam Muchmore,
Anthony Niblett, and Arden Rowell for helping to administer surveys at the University of Chicago Law
School. We thank Phoebe Holtzman for her research assistance. Malani thanks the Samuel J. Kersten
Faculty Fund and the Microsoft Fund for ﬁnancial support.
Journal of Law and Courts (Spring 2013) © 2013 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science
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with, so as to think more clearly about whether and how the baggage might be put
down.
This study approaches those questions empirically. We report the results of a lab
experiment of how law students interpret statutes before they have heard anything
about how to do it. They are asked to perform simple cognitive tasks that surround the
reading of a statute, such as separating their reading of its plain English from their
policy preferences about how it should be read or separating those things from predictions about what other readers will think the statute means or about how a court
might read it. The results offer two lessons. First, it is very difﬁcult to separate judgments about the linguistic meaning of a statute from policy preferences about it. The
same is true of predictions about what courts will do: readers tend to predict that courts
will do what the readers themselves prefer. These entanglements suggest that the ﬁrst
and probably the hardest challenge in learning to read statutes is not the mastery of
theories about how do it ðtextualism, purposivism, and so forthÞ. The challenge is to
suppress the inﬂuence of policy preferences on interpretation or to at least make it a
matter of choice rather than infection. What makes the challenge especially hard to
address is the invisibility of it. Nobody thinks their readings are contaminated, yet they
usually are; the subjective experience of interpreting a statute is an unreliable guide to
the inﬂuences that bear on it.
Second, however, the results also show that certain ways of framing the interpretive
question can help with that process of separation: they reduce the entanglement of
preferences about a text from judgments about the meaning of it. The key is to start
with a nonidealized, external reference point for making the interpretive judgment—
an approach that puts the question objectively rather than subjectively. Instead of
simply asking readers what they think the plain text of a statute means or how the
authors of it would likely want it applied, they are better asked how ordinary readers
would interpret the text. This reframing of the question much reduces the impact that
the preferences of readers have on their reading of a statute’s language. We will consider
why this might be so in due course.
Our overall goal, again, is to reconsider the baseline from which the process of
interpreting statutes is understood to proceed. We suggest that the best model is not
one in which a reader climbs from understanding little about theories of interpretation
to gaining a sophisticated knowledge of them. The more signiﬁcant climb is from a
state in which preferences greatly infect textual judgments to a state in which they are
well separated, for then one can distinctly and responsibly consider matters of interpretive methodology and judgments about policy, giving each their due without confusion and unintended inﬂuence between them. ðSome theories of interpretation may
call for the reader to exercise judgment about policy, but no theory calls for a reader to
be inﬂuenced by those judgments to an uncertain and unintended extent.Þ The education offered to lawyers about the ﬁrst climb is extensive. Education about the
second is rare, or at least rarely explicit. It may be that despite this inattention,
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experienced lawyers and judges generally overcome the tendencies found here and do
not need help separating their preferences from their interpretations. But there are
some reasons to be skeptical of that claim, and we will have a few words to say about
them at the end.
This article is related to three connected strands of the psychology literature on
communication. First, our ﬁndings are consistent with a top-down psychological
model of reading in which experience and context matters to how readers interpret
multiple words that constitute clauses or sentences ðGoodman 1985; Smith 1994Þ.
This contrasts with a bottom-up model in which words with ðinvariantÞ deﬁnitions are
connected to produce meaning that is more robust to individual reader variation.
Second, our ﬁndings are related to the cognitive psychology literature that models the
process by which readers deﬁne speciﬁc words as one in which readers categorize words
with other like words ðnot necessarily in a sentenceÞ and use experiences common to
the words in a category to deﬁne all the words in the that category. Because readers start
from different experiences, they may generate different word associations and thus
meanings ðSolan 1998; Mullins 2003–4Þ.1 Our ﬁndings suggest that context and
framing may trigger different word associations and thus meanings. Finally, our work is
consonant with experimental work on motivated reasoning and self-serving bias. Prior
work has examined how a reader’s preferences can affect the assessment of judicial
opinions ðSimon and Scurich 2011Þ2 and also judgments about fair settlements of
cases and predictions about court decisions ðLoewenstein et al. 1993; Babcock et al.
1995Þ. In combination with a prior experiment ðFarnsworth, Guzior, and Malani
2010Þ, this article suggests that preferences can also inﬂuence both personal reading of
statutory texts and predictions about courts’ interpretations.
This article is closest in design and ﬁndings to Braman ð2006Þ and Farnsworth et al.
ð2010Þ. Braman gave law students a mock legal brief with identical arguments on
both sides of a legal dispute about political speech by public employees. She randomized the content of that speech ðpro-choice or pro-lifeÞ and found that students’
opinion on the content affected their judgments about the legality of the speech.
Farnsworth et. al. used an experimental design similar to the one employed in this
study but asked law students to make threshold judgments about whether statutory
text was ambiguous. Students’ preference over outcomes were found to affect their
judgment about whether text was unclear. In this article we extend the Braman study
by examining how the framing of the inquiry alters the inﬂuence of preferences on legal
1. Solan ð1998Þ and Mullins ð2003–4Þ note that this process may explain why readers, including
judges, may disagree about the deﬁnition of speciﬁc words in legal texts.
2. This article examines how respondent’s preferences as to the outcome of a case affects their
assessment of the logic and legitimacy of an actual court judgment in that case. The design of the
experiment in that article is similar to the design in this article. The key difference is the outcome
variable: we examine how respondents read a legal text, and Simon and Scurich ð2011Þ examine how
respondents assess the reasoning in a judicial opinion.
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judgments. Importantly, it ﬁnds that framing can limit the inﬂuence of preferences,
that is, help in debiasing readers. We extend the Farnsworth et al. study by considering
not just the inﬂuence of preferences on the level of judicial discretion allowed by text
but also the ultimate legal judgments made about texts.
Section II of this article describes our survey instrument. Section III describes the
results. Section IV discusses the implications for interpretative theory. Section V addresses some limitations, including the fact that we survey law students rather than
lawyers or judges and that our survey is conducted in an experimental rather than a
practice setting. Section VI offers concluding thoughts.
II.

METHODOLOGY

We proceeded by creating survey instruments and administering them to over 1,500
law students, most of them in their ﬁrst semester of study.3 In each survey, the
respondent was presented with ambiguous statutes and facts to which they might
apply. The statutes and facts were taken from Supreme Court cases involving federal
criminal law or civil disputes. The respondents were told what position each side to the
case took.
Respondents were then asked three question, though not always in the same order.4
First, the respondents were asked what outcome of the case they preferred as a matter
of policy, setting aside the text of the statute. Second, they were asked to interpret the
text of the statute, setting aside their policy preferences. Each respondent was asked
this question in one of three different ways.5 Some were asked which reading of the
text they thought was the best ﬁt to its ordinary meaning; others were asked which
reading ordinary readers of English would think the best ﬁt to its ordinary meaning;
and yet others were asked which reading they thought was the best ﬁt to the drafters’
intent.6 Third, respondents were asked on occasion to predict which reading a court
would prefer. The goal, of course, was to ﬁnd any relationships between answers to the

3. The latest surveys were administered to ﬁrst year law students at Boston University and University of Chicago during the 2010–11 academic year. Previous surveys were administered to students
at Boston University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Virginia during the 2009–10
academic year.
4. To determine whether the order in which questions were asked affected respondents’ responses,
we randomized the order in which we asked questions about the respondent’s preferred outcome, the
respondent’s own interpretation of a statute, and the respondent’s prediction about a court’s reading. We
found no signiﬁcant effect of question order on question response.
5. Respondents were randomized to how they were asked the interpretation question. Each
respondent was asked to interpret numerous statutes using the same method of interpretation. For
example, a respondent asked the ordinary meaning of one statute would be asked the ordinary
meaning of all statutes he or she was presented during the survey.
6. We did not deﬁne “ordinary meaning,” “ordinary readers,” or “drafters’ intent” for respondents.
We did not feel we had a precise deﬁnition to offer and were concerned about our own baggage in
formulating these deﬁnitions. Moreover, we do not feel that lawyers interpreting legal texts are told the
deﬁnition of these interpretive methods when interpreting statutory text in practice. Thus the survey
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question about policy preferences and answers to the interpretive and predictive
questions. As we shall see, policy preferences seem to affect them all—but not to the
same extent.
A. Cases

Each of our surveys contained questions about a number of different statutory cases.
The results from the surveys were highly repetitive from case to case, so we review in
detail four of the cases from our most recent survey instruments.7
The ﬁrst case ð“gun use case”Þ was based on Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223
ð1993Þ.8
A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924ðcÞ, provides an enhanced prison sentence for
anyone who “uses” a ﬁrearm “in relation to . . . a drug trafﬁcking offense.”
Defendant, a drug dealer, owned a gun. He approached a confederate and
offered to trade him the gun for some cocaine. His confederate turned out to be
an undercover police ofﬁcer, and defendant was arrested. He was charged with
violating 924ðcÞ. Defendant did not brandish the gun or use it in a threatening
manner, but he did offer it as an item of barter.
The question is whether offering the gun in trade was a “use” of it within the
meaning of 924ðcÞ ðin which case the defendant gets the extra time on his prison
sentenceÞ. Defendant’s reading is that offering a gun in trade is not a “use.” The
government’s reading is that it is a “use.”
The second case ð“child pornography case”Þ, adapted from United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 ð1994Þ,9 was somewhat more complicated.

measures the effect of both the respondent’s own deﬁnition of a speciﬁc interpretive method and
their application of that method—as they deﬁne it—on speciﬁc statutory text.
7. In the full survey we asked respondents about eight cases, six of which were criminal and two
were civil. These cases, and the statutory interpretation questions they raise, are discussed in legal
scholarship on statutory interpretation or presented in casebooks or lectures on interpretation. They
would be familiar to legal scholars of interpretative method. We present results of only four cases from
our survey for the sake of concision. The four we present have the same criminal ðthreeÞ and civil
ðoneÞ mix as the ones omitted. Moreover, the four we selected yield data patterns similar to the four
we omit. For example, when respondents were asked how an ordinary reader would read the relevant
statutory text, the difference between median reading of respondents who strongly preferred that the
defendant win and the reading of respondents who strongly preferred that the government or plaintiff
win is statistically insigniﬁcant in all omitted cases except one. In contrast, the difference between
median reading across these two groups is statistically insigniﬁcant in only two cases when respondents
are asked about drafters’ intent and never insigniﬁcant when respondents are asked about ordinary
meaning. The results for the omitted cases are available upon request from the authors.
8. The court held, 6 to 3, in favor of the government.
9. The court held, 7 to 2, that the government had to prove that the defendant knew that the ﬁlms
he sold included sexually explicit acts by minors. We presented the case to our respondents in a form a
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A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, reads in part as follows:
ðaÞ Any person who—
ð1Þ knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction,
if—
ðAÞ the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
ðBÞ such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as
provided in subsection ðbÞ of this section.
The defendant was accused of violating the statute by selling pornographic
videotapes that included footage of a woman who was under the age of 18, and
thus was a minor. He defended on the ground that when he sold the tape, he did
not know the person on the tape was a minor.
The question is whether the word “knowingly” in section ð1Þ applies to the
phrase “the use of a minor” in section ð1ÞðaÞ. The defendant’s reading is that
“knowingly” does modify “the use of a minor.” The government’s reading is that
“knowingly” does not modify “the use of a minor.”
The third case ð“false statements case”Þ was based on United States v. Yermian, 468
U.S. 63 ð1984Þ.10 “The federal ‘false statements’ statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, says:”
Whoever knowingly and willfully falsiﬁes, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, ﬁctitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, ﬁctitious or fraudulent statement or
entry, if the matter lies within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States, shall be ﬁned not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ﬁve years, or both.
The defendant worked for a company that had a contract with the Department of Defense. The company asked him to ﬁll out a questionnaire to
obtain a security clearance. He did so. His company mailed the questionnaire to
the Department of Defense. The Department discovered that the defendant’s
answers contained false statements. He was charged with violating the statute
bit different, and a bit simpler, than the form it took in the Supreme Court. In the actual X-Citement
Video case, it was the defendant who argued that the scienter requirement did not reach the age of
the performers in the movies—because he claimed this made the statute unconstitutional. Since we did
not wish to engage the constitutional question, we wrote the survey question to suggest that the
defendant argued for a reading of the statute that made it harder to get a conviction under it.
10. The court held for the government, 5 to 4, that knowledge of the federal agency’s jurisdiction
on Yermian’s part was not needed to support his conviction.
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quoted above. His defense was that he had not realized that his questionnaire
would be forwarded to the government.
The question is whether the statute requires proof that a defendant knew the
matter in question was within the jurisdiction of a government agency. The
defendant’s reading is that the statute does require such proof. The government’s
reading is that it does not require such proof.
The ﬁnal case ð“attorney’s fees” caseÞ was a civil case based on West Virginia Univ.
Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 ð1991Þ.
A federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides in relevant part: “In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1983 of this title, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ½to recover from the losing party a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of its costs.” Plaintiff brought a successful lawsuit against the government to enforce section 1983 and sought to recover fees
paid to experts who advised his attorney.
The question is whether fees paid to experts by an attorney are covered by the
part of § 1988 allowing recovery of “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” The defendant’s reading is that fees of experts who advise an attorney are not covered by
§ 1988. The plaintiff ’s reading is that experts’ fees are covered.
B.

Questions

After presenting facts from one of the cases above, the survey asked each respondent
about her policy preference:
Setting aside the text of the statute, who do you think should win as a matter of
policy preference?
ðAÞ I strongly prefer that the defendant win.
ðBÞ I mildly prefer that the defendant win.
ðCÞ I mildly prefer that the government win.
ðDÞ I strongly prefer that the government win.
Each respondent was also asked whether the defendant or the government’s reading of
the statute was better. This question was asked in different ways. Some respondents
were asked:
Setting your policy preference aside, which reading better ﬁts the ordinary
meaning of the statute’s text?
ðAÞ The defendant’s reading
ðBÞ Probably the defendant’s reading
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ðCÞ Probably the government’s reading
ðDÞ The government’s reading
We will refer to the question just shown above as the “ordinary meaning” question.
Some respondents were instead asked a different question that we will call “drafters’
intent”:
Setting your policy preference aside, which reading of the statute is a better ﬁt to
what the drafters of the statute intended?
ðAÞ The defendant’s reading
ðBÞ Probably the defendant’s reading
ðCÞ Probably the government’s reading
ðDÞ The government’s reading
Other respondents were asked an “ordinary readers” question:
Setting your policy preference aside, which reading of the statute would ordinary
readers of English think is a better ﬁt to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s
text?
ðAÞ The defendant’s reading
ðBÞ Probably the defendant’s reading
ðCÞ Probably the government’s reading
ðDÞ The government’s reading
Finally, after the gun use case in particular, respondents were asked about how they
predict a court would interpret the statute:
Which side’s reading do you predict that a court would agree with?
ðAÞ The defendant’s reading
ðBÞ Probably the defendant’s reading
ðCÞ Probably the government’s reading
ðDÞ The government’s reading
We thus recorded policy preferences for everyone and examined the relationship between those preferences and the answers given to the other questions.
III.

R E S U LT S

A. The Influence of Preferences on Interpretation

Figures 1–4 describe for the four cases the correlation between respondents’ preferences
and their answers to the different versions of the interpretive question. The horizontal
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Figure 1. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the gun use
case. Color version available as online enhancement.

Figure 2. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the child
pornography case. Color version available as online enhancement.
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Figure 3. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the false
statement case. Color version available as online enhancement.

Figure 4. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the
attorney’s fees case. Color version available as online enhancement.
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axis lines up respondents according to their policy preferences about the outcome of
the case ðfrom those who strongly preferred that the defendant win to those who
strongly preferred that the government winÞ. The vertical axis shows which side’s
reading the respondents thought was best in reply to the various interpretive questions
we asked. We coded the reading from 1 to 4, where 4 indicates the most progovernment. Using this scale, each line presents the average answer to an interpretive question
among respondents with a given policy preference. The whiskers present the 95%
conﬁdence interval for each average.
The basic pattern is clear: respondents’ judgments about the ordinary meaning of
the statute’s text and about the drafters’ intent are highly correlated with their policy
preferences—even though the respondents were instructed to set those preferences
aside. The one remarkable exception is the question about which side’s interpretation
ordinary readers would think better ﬁts the ordinary meaning of the statute’s text. The
answers to that question are signiﬁcantly less correlated with respondents’ policy preferences in every case. These results are conﬁrmed in the regression analysis ðunreportedÞ. Let us consider each of these ﬁndings in detail.
1. Ordinary Meaning

The results with respect to the ordinary meaning question are stark. Judgments about
the ordinary meaning of a text are highly entwined with policy preferences about the
outcome of the case the text is being used to decide. What makes the ﬁnding especially
striking is that the respondents were explicitly told to separate the two considerations.
They could not do it.
This failure has several implications. First and most simply, interpretations of the
ordinary meaning of a text are highly prone to bias by the policy preferences of whoever
is making the claim. Second, the makers of such claims are not likely to subjectively
experience themselves as biased in this way. Their intentions were otherwise. The inﬂuence exerts itself invisibly.
2. Drafters’ Intent

The same pattern appears in answers to the drafters’ intent question.11 We thought it
possible that separating oneself a bit from the question of the statute’s meaning—being
asked not what you think it means, but what you believe the author wanted—might

11. It might seem that our respondents were not in a good position to comment on the intent
of those who drafted the statutes they read. They did not have any statements from the legislative
history, or any information about what events caused the statute to be drafted, or any knowledge of the
rest of the surrounding legal context. Still, some courts like to say that the best evidence of a
legislature’s intent is the words they chose to use; see, e.g., U.S. v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1246 ð10th
Cir. 2008Þ, so perhaps our survey-takers were not entirely disarmed. At any rate, we meant the
question mostly as a heuristic to encourage the reader to consider the context in which the drafter
wrote the statute and their possible intent in choosing the words they did.
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reduce the inﬂuence of one’s own policy preferences. Unfortunately it does not. Estimates of the drafters’ intent, like judgments about ordinary meaning, closely track the
respondents’ own wishes.
One reason for this result might be that respondents project their own preferences
onto the legislators who they imagine drafted the bill. Here, as with the ﬁrst question,
the projection evidently is unconscious, for again the respondents were told to put their
preferences aside when answering the question.
We wondered whether the answer to the drafters’ intent question might help
explain the answers to the previous question on ordinary meaning. Maybe one reason
policy preferences are bound up with replies to the ordinary meaning question is that
people try to determine ordinary meaning by guessing at what the drafters of the
statute must have meant, and they can only make headway on that question by asking
what they themselves would have wanted if they had been the drafters. This may be
part of the story, but it cannot be all of it, because the responses to the ordinary
meaning question and the drafters’ intent sometimes were different in signiﬁcant ways.
The differences between responses to the ordinary meaning question and the
drafters’ intent question are nicely illustrated in ﬁgures 2 and 3. Looking at the left half
of each chart—that is, to those respondents who preferred that the defendant win—
we ﬁnd that people answering the drafters’ intent question side with the government
more conﬁdently than people just saying which view of the text better ﬁts its ordinary meaning. In the child pornography case ðﬁg. 2Þ, 89% of those respondents who
strongly preferred that the defendant win thought the defendant’s reading better ﬁt
the statute’s ordinary meaning. By contrast, only 67% of that group thought the defendant’s reading better ﬁt the drafters’ intent. That is a signiﬁcant shift in the government’s favor. Respondents who mildly preferred that the defendant win exhibited
the same shift: 79% of them thought the defendant’s reading better ﬁt the statute’s
ordinary meaning, while only 42% of them thought the defendant’s reading better ﬁt
the drafters’ intent.12 Overall, 22% of respondents who strongly preferred that the
defendant win and 37% of respondents who mildly preferred that the defendant win
changed sides in their judgments about which side had the better reading when they
were asked about the drafters’ intent rather than about ordinary meaning. There is no
similar change in position for respondents on the right half of the graph—those respondents who preferred that the government win.
The result is easy enough to state. The drafters’ intent question makes prodefendant
respondents—but not progovernment respondents—more likely to draw conclusions
contrary to their policy preferences. The reason for that result is not so clear. Perhaps
there is a tendency to imagine that legislators are more aggressive than oneself in

12. We see the same shifts when we look at the false statement case ðﬁg. 3Þ. In that case, the shift
for respondents who strongly preferred that the defendant win is from 70% ð“ordinary meaning”Þ
to 56% ð“drafters’ intent”Þ, a change of 14%. The shift for respondents who mildly preferred that the
defendant win is from 65% ð“ordinary meaning”Þ to 48% ð“drafters’ intent”Þ, a change of 17%.
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wanting to put people in jail—that if legislators were asked which reading they preferred, they would err on the side of ﬁnding a violation when conduct arguably runs
afoul of the statute. Whatever the explanation, it is interesting to see evidence that
judgments about ordinary meaning, at least when viewed in large sets, are not quite the
same as judgments about the drafters’ intent. These evidently are experienced as related
but different questions.
3. Ordinary Readers

One of the most striking ﬁndings of this study is that policy preferences, as pervasive as
they are, do not infect all interpretive judgments equally and often seem to have little or
no effect on answers to one question in particular: which reading an ordinary reader
would think best ﬁts the ordinary meaning of the statute. We might call that the
objective form of the question about ordinary meaning, as opposed to the subjective
earlier version that asked the respondents for their own opinion about it. When asked for
a judgment about what ordinary readers would think, respondents agreed a remarkably
large share of the time. This question produces the black lines in ﬁgures 1–4 that
sometimes are ﬂat or nearly so, and that always have a lesser slope than the other lines—
showing in either case a much reduced entanglement with policy preferences.
The child pornography case—the second case shown earlier—is the strongest illustration of what effect the ordinary readers question can have. When respondents were
asked to put aside their policy preferences and say which reading they thought best ﬁt
the ordinary meaning of the statute, 85% of those who strongly preferred that the
government win as a matter of policy also said that the government’s reading was better
ðor was “probably better”Þ. But when respondents were asked which reading ordinary
readers would think a better ﬁt to the text, only 37% of those who strongly wanted
the government to win chosen the government’s reading. On the other side of the
spectrum, of those who strongly preferred that the defendant win as a matter of policy,
only 11% preferred the government’s reading ðor “probably” preferred itÞ on their own
account. But when asked which interpretation ordinary readers would likely think
correct, the number favoring the government’s reading rose to 40%. A ﬁnal way to see
the point compares the range between the answers that different respondents gave to
different questions. Those considering the child pornography problem were asked the
ordinary readers question; all groups of respondents, regardless of their policy preferences, favored the defendant’s reading from 57% to 63% of the time. When simply
asked to judge for themselves which reading is better, the numbers choosing the defendant’s reading ranged from 16% to 89%, depending on the policy preference they
reported. In short, asking what ordinary readers would think the statute meant made
the respondents much more likely to give an answer that went against their rooting
interests, whatever they were.
We should add two caveats. First, the ordinary readers question does not produce
such a strong two-way shift in every case. In the gun use case, for example, most of the
shifting is one-way. People who favor the government as a matter of policy are likely to
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shift to a judgment in favor of the defendant’s reading, but there is only a little
movement the other way. Most of those who prefer the defendant as a matter of policy
continue to say that the defendant’s reading is what ordinary readers would think
correct. Nevertheless, all respondents do come to a general agreement in their answers,
despite continued disagreement on the policy question. The gun use case seems to be
an unusual one where the question about what ordinary readers would think produces
an especially high level of agreement that the defendant is right and so calls for no
movement by those who are rooting for defendant on policy grounds. The three other
cases considered in this article all produce a two-way shift when the ordinary readers
question is asked.
Second, asking what ordinary readers would think is not a cure-all for the inﬂuence
of policy preference on interpretive judgments. In some cases that question does seem
to wipe out the inﬂuence entirely, but in others it merely reduces the inﬂuence of
preferences by comparison to its inﬂuence on other questions. Notice, for example, that
in the false statement and attorney’s fees cases in ﬁgures 3 and 4, the “ordinary readers” line has a rather steep slope. Indeed, it is steeper than the slope of the line produced in the gun use case when respondents there are asked about the ordinary meaning of the text. In other words, asking about ordinary readers in the one case is worse
ðfrom the standpoint of contamination by policy preferenceÞ than asking any question
in the other case. But that just shows that some cases produce policy preferences that
are especially hard to contain. The fact remains that in any given case, asking what
ordinary readers would think the text means always does a better job than any other
question yet found of producing an answer that is independent of policy judgments.
Why does asking what ordinary readers would think do more to ﬁlter out bias than
questions about the drafters’ intent or the likely views of a judge? It may be that thinking about what ordinary readers would say directs one’s attention to an external benchmark—the purely conventional meaning of the words—and that the attention is thus
distracted from its concerns about outcomes. It may also be the case that answers become biased when the questions have any sort of aspirational quality. The ordinary
meaning question asked which reading the respondent thought was better. The question about drafters’ intent invited the respondents to think about what someone else
would have wanted—but the someone else was not just anyone. It was a legislator, a
faceless but easily idealized author of the text who the respondents might easily imagine
has about the same way of looking at things as they do. And the same could be said of
the questions that asked what a court would likely do. This time the respondent is
asked to imagine how a judge would read the language, and again the judge is a generic
but idealized ﬁgure onto whom good sense—that is, policy preferences—can readily be
projected.
When they are asked what ordinary readers of English would think the text means,
it may be that something like the opposite movement occurs. The respondents are
asked to imagine what would be thought by a population a little different than they are:
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mere ordinary readers, perhaps not as educated as the survey respondents ðcorrectlyÞ
likely perceive themselves. So when they think about how ordinary readers would interpret the law, the respondents are looking due sideways or slightly down. “Ordinary
readers? Well, I suppose they would just think X.” The inner experience, on this speculation, is that the reading is being “averaged” over the population or even “simpliﬁed”
when one wonders what an ordinary reader would think. But the population sampling
or dumbing down, if that’s what it is, is useful in an unexpected way, because it strains
out a lot of the wishful thinking that spoils mental inquiries made with a more upwardlooking angle.
These results are consistent with earlier work in which we examined judgments
about whether a text is ambiguous ðFarnsworth et al. 2010Þ. In that study we found
that respondents with strong policy preferences about a case were much less likely to
ﬁnd the statute at issue to be ambiguous—assuming they were simply asked for their
opinion on that question. But when they were asked whether an ordinary reader of
English would likely ﬁnd the statute ambiguous, their judgments came loose from
their preferences in much the same way we see here. The difference is that in the prior
study we were talking just about threshold judgments of whether a statute fairly admits of two interpretations—an important question in statutory cases, but still separate from the ﬁnal and substantive question of what the statute means. In this study
we have extended the inquiry to that substantive question of statutory meaning, and
we ﬁnd the impact of asking an “external” or “objective” question even more profound
here than it was with respect to ambiguity.
B.

The Influence of Preferences on Predictions

After the gun use and attorney’s fees cases, we asked respondents to predict which
reading a court would prefer. As ﬁgures 5 and 6 illustrate, their answers tracked their
policy preferences.13 The results were conﬁrmed by regression analysis ðunreportedÞ.
We had speculated that asking what someone else—a judge—would think about the
statute might help the respondents give an answer that was independent of their own
preferences. It did not. In a way parallel to what we suggested when considering
drafters’ intent, it may be that respondents project their preferences onto judges when
they imagine them interpreting a text.
These results may shed a bit of light on why some lawsuits fail to settle. A typical
settlement is based on overlapping predictions the two sides make about how a court
will decide a case. To the extent those predictions are bound up with preferences about
13. The ﬁgures contain three lines, corresponding to whether subjects were asked about the better
reading of the statute using an ordinary meaning, ordinary reader, or drafters’ intent framing. The
prediction question does not directly employ such framings. However, since the prediction question is
adjacent to the better reading question, the ﬁgures are drawn to allow for the possibility of spillover
effects from the framing. Figures 4 and 5 suggest no debiasing spillover from the ordinary readers
framing.
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Figure 5. Correlation between policy preference and prediction in the gun use case.
Color version available as online enhancement.

Figure 6. Correlation between policy preference and prediction in the attorney’s fees
case. Color version available as online enhancement.
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the outcome, they are likely to diverge and shrink the bargaining range between the
parties.14
I V.

I M P L I C AT I O N S

The principal goal of this article is to shed light on some basic cognitive challenges that
lie in the way of anyone reading a statute. But once those challenges are revealed, along
with what may be a partial solution to them, it is natural to wonder how those ﬁndings
might intersect with the much more extensive scholarship about how statutes should
be interpreted from a jurisprudential standpoint. Suppose, in short, that the ﬁndings
shown above might continue to affect legal professionals who read statutes. Even if answers to the ordinary readers question are untainted by bias, how relevant are those
answers as a legal matter? Second, all worries about bias to one side, how accurate are
the answers that respondents give when they predict what ordinary readers would
think? This section addresses those two issues.
To begin with the ﬁrst question, of course there are well-developed schools of
thought about the goals of statutory interpretation, and it might seem possible to link
some of them to choices in our survey instruments. We could suppose that when we ask
which reading better comports with the drafters’ intent, we are inviting the respondents to act like “intentionalists” or “purposivists” ðManning 2005; Vermeule 1998Þ.
And when we ask what ordinary readers of the statute would say it means, we are
inviting the respondents to act like textualists—or one variety of textualist, anyway. But
this picture does not do justice to those schools of interpretive thought. Most interpreters of statutes nowadays are likely to regard judges as agents of the legislature; they
differ mostly in what evidence of legislative intent they think proper to consider
ðVermeule 2009; Easterbrook 2010; Gluck 2010Þ. Obviously a good intentionalist and
a good textualist will both want a lot more material to work with than anyone received
in our surveys. The respondents had no basis for comment on the legislature’s purpose
except their own speculations, and they did not have all the materials bearing on
“semantic context” that a textualist would want them to have.
So nothing we have found or said here strikes a great blow for any one theory of
interpretation against another. But the ﬁndings are suggestive and do allow some recommendations of emphasis. Asking what an ordinary reader would think a statute
means is an important part of one kind of textualism. It is the type that puts an es-

14. Our ﬁnding is consistent with the self-serving bias observed by Loewenstein et al. ð1993Þ and
Babcock et al. ð1995Þ. These papers report the results of experiments in which subjects are
randomized to the plaintiff or defendant position in a litigation but are presented with the same set of
facts to a dispute regardless of assigned position. When asked about a fair settlement and the court’s
likely judgment, Loewenstein et al. ﬁnds that subjects give answers that favor their side of the dispute.
Moreover, Babcock et al. ﬁnds that subjects assigned to the plaintiff or defendant’s position are much
less likely to successfully settle a case in a bargaining game as compared to subjects assigned to no
position.
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pecially high priority on the public meaning of a law. Justice Antonin Scalia is a frequent advocate of this approach to interpretation, and he often resorts to arguments
about statutes that are based on what an ordinary person might think a statute means
ðScalia 1998, 17; Manning 2005Þ. The general theory behind the argument is that
people are entitled to notice of what the law is, so a statute should be taken to mean just
what it would mean to an ordinary reader. Letting it mean anything else sets a trap and
offends the rule of law. This reasoning is especially powerful in criminal cases, where
the defendant’s interest in notice—that is, in knowing before one acts what is criminal
and what is not—seems especially important ðFarnsworth et al. 2010, 23; “Textualism
as Fair Notice” 2009Þ. The gun use case is a good example.
This study allows us to suggest another point in favor of asking what ordinary
readers would think a statute means, and giving weight to the answer. That question is
better than other common questions about meaning at producing answers that are not
contaminated by underlying policy preferences. It may or may not be the question one
would most like to have answered about a statute, but a modest question that can be
answered relatively well might be better than a perfect question that will tend to be
answered badly.
Our second question was whether the respondents to our surveys, even without bias
from their policy preferences, were correct in their statements about what an ordinary
reader would think a statute means? This is surprisingly difﬁcult to answer, even if
we assume that those who took our surveys are themselves ordinary readers. It might
seem then that we could then look at their views of what these statutes meant, use the
results of that inquiry to decide what ordinary readers in fact think, and then compare
those ﬁndings to what our respondents predicted ordinary readers would think. But
not so fast. Which of their answers should be used to show what ordinary readers
“really” think? We would not want to use everyone’s answers to the “ordinary readers”
question, because that does not show what they thought the statute meant. It shows
what they expected others to think it meant. We could just look at what our respondents said when they were asked which reading of the statute they thought was
better. But then we get answers heavily biased by policy preferences—the red line in
our graph ðassuming we choose that colorÞ. That spoils the inquiry, for a good prediction of what ordinary readers would think of a text is not supposed to be a prediction of where their biases would lead them. We would end up with a paradox in
which opinions about what ordinary readers are valuable because they are unbiased—
but also wrong because they are unbiased.
The root problem is that when we ask what an ordinary reader would think a text
means, we would like to check the answer against the views of ordinary readers who do
not have policy preferences that get in the way of their judgments. It is doubtful
whether any such readers are out there. That is one of the implications of this study.
One could try setting a baseline by asking some random population of reader what they
think a chunk of language means—“using a ﬁrearm,” perhaps—without any indication
of why the question is being asked ðin other words, without mentioning any legal caseÞ.

This content downloaded from 128.135.153.41 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 10:52:21 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Policy Preferences and Legal Interpretation

| 133

But then the respondents are being forced to interpret the words without a context, and
that is a different activity than interpreting them in the particular settings that appeared
in our questions. In the end, we suggest that what ordinary readers would think only
sounds like an empirical question. It really is not. The ordinary reader is an idealized
creature, perhaps not unlike the reasonable person who juries are instructed to imagine
in tort cases. Thinking about the ordinary reader is best understood just as a thought
experiment, or heuristic. It is a useful device for getting oneself to think a certain way
about a text—to focus on the conventional meaning of the words.
V.

L I M I TAT I O N S O F T H E S T U DY

A. Experimental Design

An initial limitation of our study is its design: it studies ﬁrst-year law students in an
experimental setting. It would be more informative to study practicing lawyers, even
judges. The scarcity of prior studies that query lawyers and judges can attest to difﬁculty of studying those populations. We chose a lower cost sample, as is often the reason lab experiments use student subjects. In our case, however, we focused on students that will in a few short years be practicing lawyers, some even judges later in their
careers.
Likewise, studying interpretive behavior in a laboratory setting may tell us little
about how students would behave in practice with clients or in a courtroom. Setting
certainly matters. It is uncertain whether real-world practice would cause students to
rely more or less on their preferences. Our surveys were conducted in the classroom
setting. Students may have felt that they were being tested by more knowledgeable
teachers and thus worked harder to suppress their own biases. Yet our study is unlikely
to be wholly uninformative. After all, hiring decisions by both law ﬁrms and judges is
based on grades that are assigned based on classroom surveys—exams—of the sort we
administered.
B.

Maturation

We study not just students, but students in their ﬁrst year of law school. It is possible
that the effects we found have worn off by the time they later become lawyers, not to
mention judges. But there are some reasons for skepticism about that. First, in prior
rounds of this research we did administer our surveys to students at the start and end
of their ﬁrst year of law school. Those surveys did not include the ordinary readers
question, but they did include other questions considered here—questions about policy preference, about which readings were more consistent with the statute’s purpose,
and about which reading of the statute was better as a matter of text. We found the
same results in both populations; there was no signiﬁcant difference ðFarnsworth et al.
2010, 34Þ. If a year of law school has not made a dent in the tendency of preferences to inﬂuence interpretive judgments, then perhaps that tendency is likely stubborn enough to keep exerting some inﬂuence later in life. And even if the overall effects
were reduced in strength, there is no reason to suppose that the relative effects of the
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Figure 7. How often US Supreme Court justices have voted for the government
in nonunanimous criminal cases since 1953.

different questions we asked would be changed. Asking what an ordinary reader would
think of a text would still be a better question than others, even if the beneﬁt in the
reduction of bias is less among seasoned lawyers than it is among others.
There is also reason to hesitate before imagining that the effects shown here have
been entirely rooted out by the time lawyers become judges. Consider the relationship
between the ﬁndings shown here and in ﬁgures 7 and 8, adapted from an earlier
empirical study of judicial behavior conducted by one of the authors of this article
ðFarnsworth 2005Þ. Figure 7 is based on career data for all of Supreme Court justices
from 1953 to 2004.15 One line shows how often each justice voted for the government
in nonunanimous criminal cases involving constitutional claims. The other line shows
their votes in nonunanimous criminal cases depending on some nonconstitutional
source of law—usually a statute or rule. The justices are ordered here according to the
data ði.e., by the mean of the two linesÞ to show the alignment between the two trends.
We can also view the comparison by removing the justices’ names from the graph
and instead putting their votes in constitutional cases along the bottom and their votes

15. The data were derived from the US Supreme Court Judicial Database at Michigan State
University. For more details and discussion, see Farnsworth ð2005, n. 7Þ.
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Figure 8. US Supreme Court justices’ votes for the government in constitutional
cases by nonconstitutional cases, 1953–2002.

in nonconstitutional cases along the side. This gives us ﬁgure 8, a scatter plot of the
same data that correlates the proportion of the justices’ votes for the government in
nonunanimous criminal cases of the two types—constitutional and not. An increase
in the share of votes for the government along one of the dimensions is very likely
to mean an increase along the other. A ﬁtted line shows a strong linear relationship
between decisions in favor of the government in either situation.16
These charts show that any given justice votes for the government about as often
in cases involving the Constitution as in cases that involve other sources of law. Why
should that be? No known theory of interpretation would cause a judge to cast similar
votes in cases that depend on entirely different sorts of legal texts. And while originalism, as a constitutional theory, might be expected to produce rulings friendly to
16. The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient ðRÞ is an extremely high .94, accounting for 88% of the
variance ðR 2Þ.
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the government ðbecause defendants often want the protections of the bill of rights
expanded beyond their original meaningÞ, it is hard to see why textualism, intentionalism, or any other approach to interpreting statutes would have similar effects.
These questions are explored more fully in the earlier work that produced the charts,
but the study presented in this article makes a helpful new contribution to an understanding of them.
Nonunanimous criminal cases in the Supreme Court are precisely the ones where
the legal materials are not conclusive on their face. They contain ambiguities and call
for interpretation; most of the cases that served as the basis for questions in our surveys
are represented in the set of nonconstitutional cases graphed above. It may well be that
when confronted with ambiguous texts—statutes, of course, but probably also cases
and constitutional provisions—judges, like other people, have trouble stopping their
policy preferences from inﬂuencing their judgments. Those policy preferences cut
across all sorts of criminal cases and are not sensitive to the particular type of legal
material ðstatute, case law, etc.Þ on which the case seems to depend. In short, when
judges vote for the government about as often in close criminal cases of every kind, we
may well wonder if it is not partly because they acting much like the respondents to
our surveys.
Obviously this is not a complete explanation of the data just shown. Some judicial
votes are better explained in other ways that do not involve the bias exerted by policy
preferences. But the purpose of this discussion is not to settle the reasons for judicial
dispute. It is to add some suggestive data to the ways that the disputes can be explained.
The charts just shown are offered here merely to cast doubt on the idea that judges are
immune to the inﬂuences of policy preference that this study has illustrated. The
evidence of judicial behavior does not suggest such immunity.
C. Causation

At times in this article we have spoken of mere “entanglement” between policy preferences and judgments about what a text means. That way of speaking implies no
causation. At other points, though, we have talked of policy preferences “inﬂuencing”
interpretive judgments or having an effect on them. Those claims do suggest causation,
of course, so we should consider whether they are hasty. Instead of policy wishes
inﬂuencing judgments about the text, could judgments about the text somehow be
inﬂuencing policy wishes?
This is not likely. The policy preferences that respondents display remain the same
regardless of what interpretive questions they are asked, but as we have seen, the answers to the interpretive questions sometimes closely follow those preferences and
sometimes do not. The causal link we suggest is supported by similar ﬁndings in
studies of wishful thinking ðGilovich 1991, 75–87; Elster 1999, 20–21Þ or “halo
effects” ðNisbett and De Camp Wilson 1977b, 1977aÞ in nonlegal settings. These
studies show how underlying preferences about outcomes or similar sources of biases
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frequently inﬂuence judgments about facts, and not the other way around. Our results
can be viewed as a particular application of that same general observation.
D. Criminal Cases

Most of the case studies in our surveys involved federal criminal law. It is possible that
the effects found here are special to criminal matters and would not carry over to civil
cases—but again, it is not likely. To address this possibility, we included a noncriminal
case that involved an award of attorney’s fees at the end of a civil action. As ﬁgure 4
illustrated, respondents displayed the same general pattern in their choices about those
cases that they did in the criminal situations, though the effects were somewhat weaker
and the progovernment effect surrounding “drafters’ intent” does not arise. That last
point lends a bit of support to our earlier conjecture that respondents tend to think of
the “drafters” as progovernment or more eager to put people in jail. In the civil context,
the government is not trying to put someone in jail, and it would be surprising to ﬁnd
that respondents thought of the “drafters” as preferring the plaintiff over the defendant,
or the other way around.
VI.

C O N C LU S I O N

The ﬁndings presented in this article suggest that the most important obstacle to
intelligent statutory interpretation is not ignorance of theories about how to do it. The
most important obstacle is cognitive; it is the tendency of policy preferences to inﬂuence the reading of a text without the reader’s awareness of it. A reader’s own difﬁculty in perceiving this inﬂuence tends to make it hard to root out. The inﬂuence is
greatest when the interpretive question is made subjective, as by asking what the reader
thinks is the best reading with all policy preferences set aside. Making the inquiry
objective, as by asking how an ordinary reader would likely read the text, is a help toward
debiasing the process of interpretation. Objective inquiries of that sort are just heuristics
and are not a complete solution to the challenges suggested here, but they are a start. It
may be that the best solution is time: perhaps professional experience reduces the
inﬂuence of preferences on interpretation. But what we can observe about judicial
behavior in close cases suggests that the tendencies found here may not be so easy to
eradicate. In that case the effects presented in this article might become a help to
understanding some behavior by legal actors, rather than just an agenda for the education of them.
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